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Most previously used measures of immigrant labor market assimilation will be biased if 
there is non-random emigration of immigrants. We use longitudinal data on immigration to 
Sweden 1970-1990 to examine the extent and pattern of immigrant emigration and its 
consequences for measures of assimilation. Large fractions of the immigrants leave the host 
country shortly after arrival; within five years, more than a quarter of the people studied 
emigrated. As expected, economic migrants are much more likely to emigrate than political 
ones. Further, within these two groups, it is the least economically successful who leave. This 
creates the impression that immigrants’ well-being relative to natives improves with time in 
Sweden. However, not adjusting for emigration leads to overestimating the rate of economic 
assimilation, for Nordic and OECD immigrants by about much as 90 percent or more. 
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Immigration to developed countries accelerated during the last three decades so that by the 
beginning of the 1990s immigrants accounted for substantial fractions of the labor force in 
many western economies (Simon, 1989). At the same time that immigration rates rose, the 
labor market performance of recently arrived immigrants generally declined compared to 
that of the native born population in these countries. 
Sweden also has experienced a substantial increase in its immigrant population as well 
as an apparent decline in the relative skills of recent immigrant arrivals (as measured by 
their earnings). By 1997 the fraction of immigrants in the population was nearly 11 percent. 
This percentage of the population was larger than the corresponding percentage in the 
United States – which is often called a "nation of immigrants." At the same time that the 
immigrant population grew, the ratio of new immigrants’ earnings to those of natives fell 
from 88 percent during the early 1970s to 54 percent in the beginning of the 1990s. 
In many western nations, the increased presence of immigrants with relatively poor 
labor market outcomes has raised policy makers’ interest in whether and how quickly 
immigrants assimilate into their labor forces. These questions are of interest not only for 
understanding how the decline in immigrant earnings has contributed to income inequality, 
but also for its implications regarding immigrants use of the social welfare system and the 
fiscal burden, if any, that they impose on natives.  
Measures of immigrant assimilation may be distorted if a significant fraction of 
immigrants emigrate back to their home country or to a third country. A cohort of new 
immigrants may appear to assimilate rapidly into the Swedish work force if the least skilled 
and least successful among them leave Sweden. Under these circumstances, analysts would 
compare natives’ earnings over time to the most successful immigrants. Earnings differences 
between natives and immigrants would narrow, but not because these immigrants acquired 
country-specific skills that improved their labor market performance.  Instead, earnings 
differences narrowed because the least prosperous immigrants eventually migrated. 
 This paper examines how measures of immigrant assimilation are affected by 
emigration.  This question is recognized to be important for determining whether evidence of 
earnings convergence between immigrants and natives can be interpreted as assimilation.  
However, because of the limitations of the data used in most studies of immigrants, little is 
known about the empirical importance of this question. There are several reasons why 
studying the Swedish experience offers a unique opportunity to study the connection between  
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measures of immigrant assimilation and emigration patterns.  First, using the Swedish 
register data we can construct a longitudinal database that follows individual immigrants 
from the time they migrate to Sweden until they leave the country.  The “LINDA” database 
contains a representative sample of three percent of the Swedish population during each year 
between 1970 and 1998 (Edin and Fredriksson, 2000). It includes information on immigrants, 
the year of immigration, their country of origin, earnings and social assistance receipts. We 
also constructed a measure of the year of emigration. Accordingly, a second advantage of 
studying the Swedish experience is that we can use this unique database to examine the 
importance of emigration in a developed country that has a comparatively high percentage of 
immigrants in its population. 
Finally, a third advantage of studying the Swedish experience is that Sweden has 
received substantial numbers of both economic and political immigrants. Theory suggests 
that these two groups’ incentives to migrate are different. The economic migrants are “self-
selected” to succeed in the Swedish labor market, whereas the same is not necessarily true for 
the political migrants. Further, the incentives (including restrictions) to emigrate back to 
their home country also likely differ between economic and political migrants. Political 
migrants should be less motivated by economic factors to emigrate. Because of shortcomings 
of other databases this issue has been difficult to address in other countries. By contrast, we 
can separately examine how assimilation rates and emigration patterns differ between these 
two groups of immigrants.  
In this paper, we first review the existing literature on the characteristics of Swedish 
immigrants. In section III, we consider alternative explanations for why immigrants might 
emigrate. In section IV, we describe our data and present some summary statistics. In section 
V, we examine the pattern of emigration from Sweden. Section VI considers alternative 
measures of immigrant assimilation and their sensitivity to the patterns of emigration. Our 
concluding remarks follow in section VII.  
II. Immigration to Sweden 
Like many other countries, Sweden has experienced a rapid growth of the foreign-born 
population over the last decades. In 1997, 11 percent of the Swedish population was born 
outside of the country. The economic migrants are largely from the OECD countries. About 
30 percent of the total immigrant population has originated from the Nordic countries, and of 
these approximately two-thirds have been from Finland. Citizens of these countries have had  
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the right to migrate freely since the 1950s. The political migrants are mostly from non-OECD 
countries and the timing of their immigration parallels the timing of important political 
events during the last half of the 20th century, e.g. Chile in the 1970’s, Poland in the early 
1980’s, Iran and Iraq in the later part of the 1980’s, and former Yugoslavia in the 1990’s. 
   During the 1960’s, economic or “labor” migration dominated the inflow of immigrants 
to Sweden. This flow reached a peak in 1970 when almost 80,000 people arrived. Two years 
later, labor migration from outside the Nordic countries essentially was stopped (Svanberg 
and Tydén, 1998). Since then, there has been a shift from labor to refugee migration, and 
people have arrived from countries that experienced political upheavals.  Accordingly, during 
the early period covered by our study, the majority of immigrants in our sample migrated for 
economic reasons, whereas during the later period a majority of immigrants entered Sweden 
on political grounds. 
A substantial literature already documents the labor market performance of 
immigrants to Sweden (see Arai, Regnér and Schröder (1999)). As in other Western countries, 
the economic performance of Swedish immigrants varies substantially according to their 
country of origin. This relation appears to hold both for recent immigrants and for earlier 
migrants who arrived prior to 1970. Differences in educational attainment have not 
explained a substantial portion of the difference in immigrant performance. Among college-
educated immigrants, those from Western Europe have earned substantially more than those 
from Southern Europe (Wadensjö, 1992). Furthermore, Rooth (1999) shows that labor market 
performance varies by country of origin among refugees arriving in the late 1980’s, and that 
unobserved characteristics account for an important part of the difference. 
The existing literature also provides evidence that, as in other Western countries, the 
relative earnings of immigrants compared to natives have declined (Aguilar and Gustafsson, 
1994; Scott, 1999). According to Ekberg (1993), immigrants earned on average 20 percent 
more than natives in the late 1960’s; twenty years later the figures were the reversed. This 
decline did not result from a decline in immigrants’ relative schooling or labor market 
experience (Wadensjö, 1994). Instead, the decline appears to be connected with a shift in the 
immigrants’ country of origin toward source countries whose migrants have historically 
performed more poorly in the Swedish labor market.  
Understanding the connection between immigrant labor market status and their 
country of origin is important when examining the question of immigrant assimilation. A 
drop in relative earnings does not necessarily mean that the economic standing for different  
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groups of immigrants has deterred, because of the probable changes in the composition of 
Swedish immigrants. Similarly, higher earnings for early than recent immigrants in the 
cross section does not provide evidence on assimilation, since the later cohorts may 
increasingly consist of less skilled people (Borjas, 1985). 
Results from the 1990 Census presented in Scott (1999) indicate that within country 
groups there are often not very large differences in the earnings of successive immigrant 
cohorts. This finding suggests that assimilation rates are low. A more direct way to measure 
the extent of individual immigrant assimilation in Sweden would be to adopt the approach 
taken by Ekberg (1994) and follow essentially the same sample of immigrants through time. 
In his study of immigrants arriving before 1970, he used data from the Censuses and the tax 
registers to compute the ratio of immigrant and native earnings every five years from 1970 
until 1990. The results of his study suggest that there was no change in the relative earnings 
of immigrants among those arriving in Sweden prior to 1970. Throughout the period covered 
in his study male immigrant workers earned 98 percent of the earnings of native males. 
However, over time the fraction of immigrants who were employed decreased relative to 
natives. 
One interpretation of Ekberg’s finding is that the pre-1970 immigrants were essentially 
assimilated when they arrived in Sweden (or were essentially assimilated by 1970) and as a 
result did not acquire any additional country-specific skills that raised their earnings and 
employment prospects relative to natives. These immigrants consisted of an especially large 
percentage of immigrants from other Nordic countries in which the customs, language, and 
level of economic development were more similar to those in Sweden than is the case for 
immigrants from other countries. 
The foregoing finding is consistent with studies of U.S. immigration that indicate that 
the rate of immigrant assimilation is positively correlated with the size of the initial 
earnings differential between immigrants and similarly skilled natives (Duleep and Regets, 
1997). Consequently, Western European immigrants to the U.S. exhibit much slower rates of 
assimilation than do Mexican and East Asian immigrants. But at the same time the earnings 
of European immigrants are relatively high even when they first arrive in the U.S. This 
result suggests that unlike other immigrant groups they already possess some of the U.S. 
specific skills that their counterparts from Latin America and Asia lack.   
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III. Factors Influencing Immigrant Emigration 
The pattern of return migration of immigrants to Sweden has been the subject of a limited 
number of studies. The rate of return migration is high, but this rate has probably decreased 
somewhat over time. Among persons in the 1970 immigrant cohort, 41 percent left Sweden 
within five years; in the 1980 cohort the figure was 33 percent (Diaconescu and Tryggveson, 
1992)1. This change is connected with the shift from labor to refugee migration discussed 
above.  Economic migrants have better opportunities to return to their home country and it is 
thus not surprising that this group has higher emigration rates (Lundh and Ohlsson, 1994). 
Among economic migrants, return migration is not random. Klinthäll (2000) studied the 
return migration of immigrants arriving from Germany, Greece, Italy, and the U.S. after 
1968. He found that approximately 40 percent left Sweden within five years, and that labor 
market success was an important determinant of return migration. 
If immigrants do not randomly return to their home country or migrate to a third 
country, emigration may distort measures of immigrant assimilation. The literature contains 
several different explanations for return migration that yield different predictions about 
immigrants' stays in the receiving country and whether high or low skilled workers are more 
likely to emigrate (LaLonde and Topel, 1997). One explanation parallels that of immigration: 
migrants return when the present discounted value of earnings in the host country is less 
than that in the source country. This might occur if migrants learn that they are not as 
productive in the host country as they had anticipated and accordingly they revise their 
expectations of future earnings. Alternatively, conditions in the source country might have 
improved, making it more attractive to return home. 
Whether the unskilled or skilled are more likely to emigrate also depends on changes in 
the distribution of earnings in the source and receiving countries (Borjas, 1988). Market 
reforms in the source country that substantially increase earnings inequality would more 
likely encourage skilled than unskilled migrants to return home. These migrants expect 
greater growth in the return to their skills. Similarly, trends toward greater income equality 
in the host country are more likely to encourage skilled immigrants to leave. 
There are other plausible economic motives for immigrants to emigrate. For example, if 
individuals prefer consumption including consumption of non-market time at home instead of 
abroad, immigrants will return home when their savings are sufficiently high (Stark, 1994). 
                                                  
1 “Within five years” in Diaconescu and Tryggveson (1992), corresponds to within six years in our study. For a 
comparison of emigration rates between our data and that for the total immigrant population, see Figure A2.  
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Under these circumstances, we expect that more skilled immigrants would have shorter stays 
in the host country than their less skilled counterparts. A related explanation holds that 
some immigrants arrive in the host country intending to return once they acquire skills that 
make them more productive back home. Again this explanation suggests that it is the more 
skilled immigrants that are the most likely to migrate.  
These alternative views of the economic motivation for emigration yield different 
predictions about which immigrants are likely to migrate. In turn, these views also have 
different implications about how emigration affects measures of assimilation. If more highly 
skilled immigrants tend to emigrate, the relative earnings of immigrants to natives might 
decline even if the least skilled immigrants assimilate rapidly. Conversely, if the least skilled 
immigrants migrate, the growth of immigrants’ relative earnings overstates the rate of 
assimilation, because the pool of immigrants is increasingly consisting of those individuals 
who were the most skilled in the first place. 
IV. The Sample 
We obtain our sample for this study from the LINDA database. It contains longitudinal 
information on immigrants and natives from the Swedish Censuses and from the population 
(RTB) and individual income registers. The resulting file includes information on 
immigrants' and natives' demographic characteristics, incomes, tax payments, and transfers. 
In addition to the information available for natives, for immigrants the file includes 
information on the latest year that they immigrated to Sweden, their country of birth, and 
the approximate year that they emigrated from Sweden. We provide more detail on how we 
constructed the database and how we defined the variables used in this study in the 
appendix.  
Our measure of the year of emigration has two principal limitations. First, we cannot 
distinguish between persons leaving the sample because they died from those who left the 
sample because they emigrated. However, we present evidence below based on the 
emigration rates indicating that deaths do not likely account for the patterns of emigration 
that we observe in the data. Further, we show in the appendix that our emigration measure 
closely tracks official statistics from Statistics Sweden. The second limitation is that people 
may not always exit registers immediately when they leave Sweden. We give some more 
detail on this problem in the appendix.  
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Our longitudinal sample is different than some other such samples of immigrants. We 
do not match longitudinal data to a single cross-sectional sample of the immigrant population 
(Lubotsky, 1999). In this case we would observe earnings growth only for immigrants who 
stay. Instead, our sample consists of three percent of the immigrant inflow from 1970 through 
1990. For each of these individuals, we match longitudinal histories from immigration 
through 1997, or until the person emigrates. Therefore, we can observe earnings growth both 
for stayers and emigrants. 
Our sample contains 15,574 immigrants who arrived in Sweden between 1970 and 
1990. Approximately 42 percent of the sample are immigrants from other Nordic countries. 
These immigrants can migrate freely without restrictions. Another 15 percent of the sample 
immigrated from other OECD countries. These immigrants usually come for work-related 
reasons and their migration is restricted. Finally, the remaining immigrants arrive from 
non-OECD countries. Over time an important shift has occurred in the composition of 
immigrants to Sweden. In the early 1970s more than 60 percent of immigrants arrived from 
other Nordic countries. But by 1990, nearly 60 percent of immigrants were from non-OECD 
countries. 
As shown by the first panel of Table 1, during the period covered by our study 
approximately 55 percent of new immigrants were males, 52 percent were married and their 
average age upon arrival was 29. These characteristics were similar among immigrant 
groups, except that Nordic immigrants were substantially less likely to be married, and that 
the fraction of males was higher in the OECD group. As expected, immigrants likely arriving 
for work-related reasons earn more and have been much less likely to receive public 
assistance. During their first full year (year t+1) in Sweden, the earnings of Nordic 
immigrants have been on average twice those of immigrants from non-OECD countries. 
Further, only 17 percent of the Nordic immigrants compared with 60 percent of the non-
OECD immigrants received social assistance during their first full year in Sweden.2 
The shift in immigrant composition toward less skilled migrants from non-OECD 
countries implies that the skills of new immigrants (as measured by their earnings) declined 
relative to natives. As discussed above this finding has been noted in the literature on 
                                                  
2 Our sample contains individuals aged 18–55 at arrival. If a large fraction of the younger people initially 
entered school instead of the labor market, this could bias our results. We have therefore performed the 
analysis presented in the paper on a sample restricted to those above 25 years of age at immigration. All 
qualitative aspects of our results hold also with that restriction. We also repeated our analysis with the self-
employed excluded from the sample, and received results that are very similar to the ones presented.  
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Swedish immigration and has been documented in other developed countries. During the last 
30 years, the ratio of new immigrant earnings to native earnings declined from 0.88 in 1970 
to approximately 0.54 in 1990 and 0.27 by 1995. This massive decline is to a large extent 
driven by the high unemployment rates in the mid-1990’s that especially affected the newly 
arrived immigrants. When we limit our earnings comparisons to persons who worked during 
the year, the ratio declines from 0.90 in 1970 to 0.74 in 1995. 
 
Table 1. Group characteristics, variable means, standard deviations in parentheses. 
Variable  Nordic  OECD  Non-OECD  Total 
Male  54.0  60.3  53.1  54.6 
  (49.8)  (48.9)  (49.9)  (49.8) 
Age  27.6  29.2  29.6  28.7 
  (8.6)  (8.1)  (8.2)  (8.4) 
Married  35.4  55.0  65.5  51.7 
  (47.8)  (49.8)  (47.6)  (50.0) 
Earnings t+1  124.129  112.587  65.458  95.365 
  (114.269)  (156.452)  (72.942)  (109.582) 
SA receipt t+1  16.5  10.5  60.3  42.8 
  (37.2)  (30.7)  (48.9)  (49.5) 
         
# individuals  6,668  2,325  6,581  15,574 
         
Notes: “Male” is the percentage males; “Age” is age at immigration, in the sample 17<age at immigration<56; 
“Married” is the fraction of people that are married (of those with civil status not missing in the registers); 
“Earnings” is earnings one year after immigration, presented in 1997 SEK (thousands) adjusted by index for 
all natives; SA receipt is the percentage receiving social assistance in the first year after immigration. 
 
V. The Pattern of Immigrant Emigration from Sweden  
A. Emigration Rates for Economic and Political Migrants 
Swedish immigrants have relatively high emigration rates. Among the cohorts that 
immigrated to Sweden during the 21-year period between 1970 and 1990, more than one 
quarter left the country within five years of their arrival. During this period, this fraction 
has declined from above one-third for cohorts arriving at the beginning of the 1970s to about 
one-fifth for the cohorts arriving in the late 1980s. 
The decline in emigration rates is largely accounted for by the shift in the composition 
of immigrants away from those arriving from the Nordic countries. As indicated by Table 2, 
immigrants from these countries have had consistently higher emigration rates than have 
those arriving from other source countries. Over the period studied, about 44 percent of  
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Nordic immigrants had left Sweden within five years of their arrival. Moreover, this fraction 
rose during the late 1980s. 
 
Table 2. Return migration within five years by group and cohort, percentages. 
Cohort  Nordic  OECD  Non-OECD  Total 
70  43.1  31.2  17.9  36.1 
71  44.0  36.7  18.2  36.1 
72  38.3  39.6  8.7  30.8 
73  38.4  38.7  11.9  30.9 
74  44.5  31.6  10.5  33.9 
75  40.4  26.1  10.6  30.6 
76  32.9  28.9  13.0  26.3 
77  38.0  32.7  12.5  28.9 
78  39.1  23.4  14.6  28.0 
79  44.2  28.9  9.5  30.6 
80  49.4  32.3  9.2  32.2 
81  52.1  36.4  10.5  31.2 
82  42.3  32.1  10.2  23.2 
83  44.3  41.0  10.0  29.2 
84  40.8  20.4  8.6  20.9 
85  41.7  18.8  7.3  18.2 
86  45.3  31.0  3.6  18.3 
87  44.6  32.0  5.5  19.0 
88  51.2  23.9  6.0  19.9 
89  50.7  25.9  6.2  22.6 
90  57.4  21.1  7.9  24.6 
         
Total  43.8  30.6  8.9  27.1 
Notes: Percentage that is no longer in data in the sixth year after arrival, including year of immigration. 
 
By contrast, immigration rates are significantly lower for immigrants from non-OECD 
countries. Only nine percent had emigrated within five years of their arrival, and during the 
period we studied the fraction of non-OECD immigrants who emigrated exhibits a downward 
trend. Therefore, in addition to the compositional change in immigrants, the declining 
emigration rates among immigrants from non-OECD countries also partly account for the 
downward trend in emigration rates for Swedish immigrants. This evidence indicates that 
political and economic immigrants face different incentives (and restrictions) to migrate. 
We can follow some of the earlier immigrant arrivals in our sample for more than a 
quarter of a century. (Note that when studying emigration over a long time period, the 
inclusion of deceased in the “emigration rate” may be more problematic than when studying 
shorter periods.) Among persons in the early 1970s cohorts, approximately one-half 
emigrated within 25 years. However, the fraction of Nordic immigrants from these cohorts 
who emigrated by the end of our sample frame exceeds two-thirds. The figures are well in 
line with numbers for the total Swedish immigrant population presented in Diaconescu and  
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Tryggveson (1992). These immigrants, who likely arrive for work-related reasons, do not tend 
to stay permanently in Sweden. By contrast, more than 70 percent of the non-OECD 
immigrants from that period were still in Sweden more than a quarter of a century later. 
This evidence also underscores the point that economic migrants to Sweden, especially those 
from relatively developed countries have high emigration rates, while those who are likely 
migrating for political reasons and from less developed countries are much less likely to 
emigrate and tend to stay permanently in Sweden. 
These emigration figures are much higher than those estimated for the United States. 
Although comparable U.S. data is unavailable, studies estimate that between 30 to 40 
percent of immigrants to the U.S. eventually emigrate (Warren and Peck, 1980; Borjas and 
Bratsberg, 1996). These emigration rates are more similar to those for Swedish immigrants 
from non-OECD countries, even though only a relatively modest fraction of U.S. immigrants 
arrive for political reasons. 
B. The Timing of Emigration 
During the first year in Sweden emigration rates are relatively low, but they rise sharply 
during the second and third year in the country, and then remain high for a couple of years 
before they decline (Table 3).  This pattern holds both for Nordic and OECD immigrants, but 
is much less apparent for immigrants from non-OECD countries. The lesson from this table is 
that if an immigrant is going to leave Sweden, they are highly likely to leave within a few 
years of their arrival. Once they have been in Sweden for five or six years the likelihood of 
emigrating in any given year is relatively low. Apparently, emigration after many years in 
Sweden is rare.  
Once immigrants have been in Sweden for a long time, the differences in emigration 
rates between economic or political migrants get smaller, but are still substantial after ten 
years. However, the most striking differences in emigration rates among immigrants from 




Table 3. Return migration by group, conditional probabilities, percentages. 
Emigration in year  Nordic  OECD  Non-OECD  Total 
1  2.74  1.46  1.46  2.01 
2  17.30  8.12  1.77  9.32 
3  13.80  8.65  1.82  7.50 
4  11.53  9.83  1.93  6.59 
5  8.31  6.92  2.23  4.99 
6  7.04  7.50  1.83  4.36 
7  5.77  5.22  1.90  3.60 
8  5.60  5.09  1.89  3.51 
9  4.62  4.97  1.61  3.03 
10  3.89  4.33  1.46  2.62 
11  4.04  3.92  1.17  2.47 
12  3.06  3.66  1.42  2.21 
13  3.57  1.95  0.83  1.87 
14  2.33  2.37  1.10  1.62 
15  1.57  2.84  1.01  1.38 
16  1.89  2.47  1.57  1.67 
17  2.02  1.87  1.05  1.41 
18  1.40  2.24  1.07  1.24 
19  1.50  1.65  0.72  1.05 
20  1.50  1.13  1.01  1.08 
21  1.63  2.04  1.22  1.34 
22  1.51  2.09  1.04  1.23 
23  0.80  1.47  0.50  0.69 
24  1.05  1.39  0.85  0.89 
25  2.98  0.60  1.62  1.72 
26  2.22  4.01  0.36  1.54 
27  1.11  0.00  0.00  0.45 
         
         
Notes: Table shows conditional emigration probabilities. Formally: Pr (Emigration in year X | Stay to X-1). 
 
 
C. Emigrants’ Place in the Immigrant Earnings Distribution 
In the tables below, we present figures for how emigration within five or ten years after 
immigration relates to initial economic outcomes in Sweden. Throughout, we discuss the 
results for the five-year period, and mention the ten-year period only when the results differ. 
Among economic migrants, those who leave Sweden tend to be less successful labor force 
participants than their counterparts who stay. As shown by Table 4, immigrants who 
emigrate within their first five years in Sweden, tend to earn less and participate less in the 
labor force. Although, the average difference between the earnings of emigrants and stayers 
is positive, this result reflects the relatively high proportion of Nordic immigrants among 
emigrants from Sweden. As discussed above, immigrants from these countries perform better  
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in the Swedish labor market than other immigrants. Among the population of Nordic 
immigrants, those who emigrated within five years of arrival earned 12 percent (11 log 
points) less during their first full year in Sweden than those who stayed. We also observe a 
similar though smaller gap between the earnings of emigrants and stayers among the OECD 
immigrants. However, among the non-OECD immigrants the difference between the 
earnings of emigrants and stayers is very small. 
Even more striking differences between emigrants and stayers are seen in the 
percentages that worked for pay during their first full year in Sweden. Among the immigrant 
groups studied, the percentage of emigrants who worked after arriving in Sweden is 8 to 18 
percentage points lower than the corresponding percentages for the stayers. This evidence 
indicates that immigrants who emigrate are substantially less attached to the Swedish 
workforce. This evidence works against the contention that the Swedish welfare state tends 
to attract and retain immigrants prone to receive public assistance and at the same time 
encourage more economically productive immigrants to leave. At least among likely 
economic immigrants, those most likely to leave Sweden are those who are least likely to find 




Table 4. Labor market outcomes for stayers and emigrants in the first full year in Sweden, 
immigration year+1, emigration within five or ten years. 
  Within five years    Within ten years 
  Earnings>0, perc.  Ln(Earnings)    Earnings>0, perc.  Ln(Earnings) 
  Stayed  Emigr.  Stayed  Emigr.    Stayed  Emigr.  Stayed  Emigr. 
                   
Nordic  86.2  77.8  4.76  4.65    86.6  78.6  4.78  4.66 
  (34.5)  (41.6)  (0.87)  (1.03)    (34.1)  (41.0)  (0.82)  (1.00) 
                   
OECD  79.4  64.4  4.54  4.48    81.5  66.1  4.55  4.46 
  (40.4)  (47.9)  (1.04)  (1.54)    (38.8)  (47.4)  (0.98)  (1.39) 
                   
Non-
OECD  74.7  57.2  4.06  4.04 
 
78.9  64.4  4.15  4.11 
  (43.5)  (49.5)  (1.18)  (1.27)    (40.8)  (47.9)  (1.10)  (1.25) 
                   
Total  79.2  72.0  4.38  4.54    81.9  73.4  4.43  4.54 
  (40.6)  (44.9)  (1.11)  (1.18)    (38.5)  (44.2)  (1.03)  (1.14) 
Notes: “Earnings>0” shows percentages with positive earnings; ln(earnings) is the mean of log earnings for, 
std dev in parentheses. Measures in t+1, conditional on staying to t+2. 
 
To see how immigrants’ earnings during their first years in Sweden are associated with 
subsequent emigration we estimate a linear probability model in which the dependent 
variable is whether the individual emigrated within five (ten) years of arrival. We controlled 
for immigrants’ gender, age (and its square), the region of origin, year of arrival, and 
interactions between year of arrival and region of origin. Our measures of earnings are (i) log 
earnings and (ii) earnings and whether the individual had any earnings during their first full 
year in Sweden. 
We find that among immigrants who worked during their first full year in Sweden and 
did not migrate at least until their second year in the country, earnings during that first year 
is negatively associated with the probability of emigrating. However as summarized by Table 
5, the magnitude of this relation is relatively small. The coefficient of -0.017 implies that a 
doubling of earnings (which is about one standard deviation of the mean level of immigrant 
earnings among those who work) is associated with less than a 2 percentage point decline in 
emigration probabilities. Given that on average approximately 25 percent of immigrants 
leave within 5 years this estimate is not especially large. The elasticity of emigration with 
respect to earnings is about 0.07. The effect in the ten-year model is a little bit larger; the 
point estimate of -0.030 implies an elasticity of about 0.08. 
The foregoing figures summarize the relation between emigration and earnings among 
individuals who worked during their first full year in Sweden. However, whether immigrants  
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work for pay during their first full year in Sweden has a stronger relationship with 
emigration probabilities. The percentage emigrating within the first 5 years of arrival was 
almost 11 percentage points lower among immigrants who worked for pay compared to 
immigrants who did not work during their first full year in Sweden. The percentage of 
immigrants who worked for pay during their first full year in Sweden and left the country 
within the first 10 years in the country was 16 percentage points lower compared to those 
who did not work. These findings underscore our point that emigration is associated with 
lack of labor force attachment. This appears to be the primary mechanism through which 
lower earnings are associated with increased emigration rates.3  
 
Table 5. Probability of emigrating within five or ten years, linear prob. 
  Five years  Ten years 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Ln(Earnings)  -0.017    -0.030   
  (0.003)    (0.005)   
Earnings/1000    0.051    -0.0023 
    (0.034)    (0.049) 
Earnings>0    -0.111    -0.157 
    (0.009)    (0.012) 
Male  0.057  0.046  0.082  0.077 
  (0.007)  (0.006)  (0.010)  (0.009) 
Age  0.003  0.003  0.000  0.000 
  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.003) 
Agesq*10-3  -0.060  -0.063  -0.012  -0.024 
  (0.044)  (0.037)  (0.060)  (0.052) 
         
N  10,779  13,838  8,477  10,701 
Adj R2  0.10  0.11  0.12  0.13 
Notes: OLS parameter estimates, standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable=1 if 
individual emigrated within five (ten) years. Outcomes in immigration year +1. Real income-
adjusted earnings in 1997 SEK (thousands). Also included: Controls for immigration year, country of 
origin group and interactions group*im year. Sample for outcomes in im year +1 conditional on 
staying at least to t+2. 
 
D. Emigration and the Welfare System 
Immigrant earnings patterns indicate that once we account for an immigrant’s country of 
origin those who are more skilled and more attached to the workforce are more likely to 
remain in Sweden. This finding suggests that immigrants who stay are less likely to be 
                                                  
3 Slightly modified versions of Table 5 indicate that holding initial earnings constant, there are substantial 
differences in emigration rates between groups. For example, non-OECD migrants were about 22 percent less 
likely than Nordic immigrants to emigrate within five years of arrival. We have also performed the estimations 
of Table 5 separately by gender. The results indicate that the effect of employment on the emigration 




burden on the social welfare system than immigrants who migrate. The LINDA database 
allows us to explore this question because it includes information on annual payments for 
social assistance and for study allowances.  
Table 6 shows that immigrants who migrated within the first five years of arrival were 
less likely to receive social assistance during their first full year in Sweden. Furthermore, 
when they did receive such aid they tended to receive less of it than their counterparts who 
stayed. Among those who emigrated, the percentage that received social assistance during 
their first full year in the country was about one-half of the corresponding percentage for 
immigrants who stayed. Further, among those emigrants who did receive public assistance 
during that year, the mean duration was 32 percent lower among emigrants.4 For emigration 
within ten years, the differences are somewhat smaller, but still substantial. 
The main reason that emigrants were less likely to have received public assistance is 
that they consist of a larger proportion of Nordic and other OECD immigrants than do the 
stayers. Among Nordic immigrants, slightly higher fractions of emigrants than stayers 
received public assistance during their first full year in Sweden, and the number of months 
as a recipient also is somewhat larger, especially over a ten-year period. Among the other 
OECD immigrants, rates of social assistance are even lower. But, it seems that stayers are a 
little more likely to receive benefits, and when they do, receive it for a longer period of time.  
Immigrants from non-OECD countries have by far the highest percentage of persons 
who received social assistance. Moreover, non-OECD immigrants who stay in Sweden are 
more likely to have received social assistance during their first full year in the country, and 
when they received such aid to have done it for a longer time period. This finding may be of 
concern to policy makers because the composition of Swedish immigration shifted during the 
latter part of the 20th century toward immigrants from these countries.5 
                                                  
4 Months of receipt is preferred as a measure of the level of social assistance dependence because the amount 
received depends on the size of the household. 
5 The relation between earnings and emigration appears not to be in accordance with the results for social 
assistance. One possible explanation to this is that social assistance is a household based benefit. If stayers live 
in larger households, individuals may earn more and still be eligible for social assistance. The fact that 54 
percent of stayers but only 36 percent of emigrants were married in their first year in Sweden (a pattern that 
holds also within groups) is consistent with this explanation. However, the patterns of Table 6 hold also when 
it is calculated for the non-married and the married separately. Furthermore, regressions similar to those in 
Table 5, but with social assistance receipt instead of earnings and employment, show the same pattern as 
Table 6: a significantly negative correlation between receipt and emigration among non-OECD immigrants, 




Table 6. Social assistance in first full year in Sweden, t+1. 
  Within 5 years    Within 10 years 
  Stayed  Emigr.    Stayed  Emigr. 
           
Nordic           
Reception, perc.  16.1  17.4    16.9  19.5 
Months|recep.  3.9  4.3    3.9  5.4 
# individuals  1,059  562    439  385 
           
OECD           
Reception, perc.  11.0  8.8    12.6  8.1 
Months|recep.  3.7  2.6    3.9  3.9 
# individuals  648  171    301  186 
           
Non-OECD           
Reception, perc.  61.2  43.9    61.5  53.1 
Months|recep.  7.9  6.7    7.9  7.6 
# individuals  3,735  187    1,701  213 
           
Total           
Reception, perc.  46.4  21.2    47.4  25.9 
Months|recep.  7.6  5.2    7.6  6.7 
# individuals  5,442  920    2,441  784 
           
Notes: “Reception” is the percentage with amount>0; “Months” is the average number of months of 
social assistance reception conditional on reception. 
 
 
Immigrants to Sweden are not automatically eligible for study allowances. The general 
rule is that the person must have come to the country with another purpose than to study. 
Refugees are generally eligible for allowances, and other immigrants qualify by living and 
working in Sweden for a minimum of two years.6 There are thus ways to come to Sweden, 
stay for a limited period, get an education, and then return. Because the initial receipt of 
study allowances may not be the appropriate measure to study, we use also data on receipt in 
later years in Sweden. The information contained in the database on study allowances 
reveals a somewhat similar pattern as the information on social assistance, but should be 
interpreted differently. As shown by Table 7, immigrants from the non-OECD countries are 
more likely than immigrants from other countries to receive such allowances. Further, those 
                                                  
6 According to the rules, being unemployed, in a labor market program or taking care of own child or other 
close relative is equivalent to working.  
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who stay in Sweden are more likely to receive allowances than those who emigrate. 7 This 
latter finding also holds for Nordic and other OECD immigrants. For both groups, those who 
stay received more study allowances during their first full year in Sweden than did those 
immigrants who eventually migrated. 
By contrast, to the findings on the receipt of social assistance by immigrants, the 
figures on the receipt of study allowances may be more encouraging to policy makers. 
Immigrants from all groups who received such allowances after their arrival have been much 
more likely to stay in the country for at least ten years. This behavior makes it possible that 
these allowances might constitute a productive social investment in immigrants. As a group, 
immigrants do not use these allowances to enhance their skills and then migrate back to 
their home countries where they then realize the returns on Sweden's investment in their 
skills. The data indicates that immigrants who receive a study allowance after arrival in 
Sweden are signaling that they are likely to remain in the country for many years. 
Table 7. Reception of study allowances. 
  Within 5 years    Within 10 years 
  Stayed  Emigrated    Stayed  Emigrated 
Nordic           
t+1  1.5  0.7    2.5  1.3 
t+3  3.8  3.3    5.0  3.3 
t+7        4.6  3.3 
OECD           
t+1  2.3  0.0    2.3  1.1 
t+3  6.3  0.0    5.0  3.8 
t+7        5.6  0.0 
Non-OECD           
t+1  7.6  4.3    9.1  7.5 
t+3  11.8  6.0    13.0  13.2 
t+7        7.6  12.3 
Total           
t+1  5.8  1.3    7.1  2.9 
t+3  9.6  3.4    10.6  6.8 
t+7        6.8  6.6 
           
Notes: Percentage of the group receiving study allowances in year t+x.  
 
VI. Emigration's Effects on Measures of Assimilation 
The implication of the pattern of emigration on measures of assimilation is that, for the 
whole group of immigrants, those who stay are less skilled than the immigrants who leave. 
                                                  
7 Except for emigration within 10 years in the non-OECD group in t+3 and t+7.  
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This skill difference arises in Sweden because individuals from countries whose immigrants 
have high earnings tend to emigrate, whereas those from countries whose immigrants have 
low earnings tend to stay. This pattern occurs because immigrants with low earnings tend to 
be from countries that send political migrants. As we observed above, even if we account for 
initial labor market success in Sweden, immigrants from such countries are less likely to 
emigrate.  
Instead, when we examine separately the connection between labor market success and 
subsequent emigration rates among economic and political migrants, we find that it is the 
less skilled or less successful who appear to leave. This means that the implications of 
emigration for measures of assimilation are likely different when studying the whole 
immigrant population than when studying economic and political migrants separately. 
 In the literature, there are at least two ways to define whether assimilation has 
occurred. First, over time do the earnings of immigrants "catch up" with the typical native? 
Second, do immigrants acquire country-specific human capital that leads to higher earnings? 
The concepts of assimilation underlying these two questions differ and so the estimates that 
they generate also differ, especially in recent years when the new immigrants became 
markedly more economically disadvantaged relative to their native counterparts.  
To answer the first question on assimilation, we can simply compare native and 
immigrant earnings to see if, and in that case when, immigrants reach native earnings 
levels. If age-earnings profiles and skill premiums differ between natives and immigrants, we 
cannot answer the second question by relating immigrants to natives. Alternative 
comparisons used in the literature include natives of the same ethnicity as immigrants, or 
immigrants of the same ethnicity who have been in the host country for many years (Borjas, 
1985; LaLonde and Topel, 1992). The idea here is that this comparison group shares some 
characteristics with more recent immigrants, but is fully assimilated, even though it has not 
caught up to the typical native. Below we consider the second of these two options when 
computing measures of immigrant assimilation. 
 
A. Results From the 1996 Cross Section 
To show how computations from the Swedish data compare to those reported in the 
literature, we begin by adopting a variant of the approach used by Chiswick (1978). Chiswick 
measured assimilation using cross-sectional data from the 1970 U.S. Census. He compared 
the 1969 earnings of comparably skilled immigrants who had spent differing amounts of time  
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in the United States. In the Swedish context, we estimate the parameters of the following 
model of immigrant earnings: 
  i i i i IMM X y e d b a + + + =   (1) 
where  i y  denotes earnings in 1996, the last year covered in our sampling frame,  i X  denotes 
age and age squared, and  i IMM  denotes a vector of dummy variables indicating the number 
of years since migration. The categories we consider are 1 to 5 years, 6 to 10 years, 11 - 15 
years, 16 to 20 years, and more than 20 years, which is the reference category in the analysis. 
We estimate this relation in aggregate, and separately by region of origin and gender “cells’’ 
for all immigrants who arrived prior to 1996 and were still in Sweden in 1997.  
It is well known that this approach will suffer from bias if there are changes in cohort 
quality, or if there is non-random emigration of immigrants. The results of the first panel of 
Table 8 suggest that among economic migrants, earnings do not rise significantly with time 
in Sweden. With the exception of Nordic women, the earnings of new immigrants to Sweden 
are not significantly lower than are those of comparably aged immigrants who had been in 
Sweden for more than 20 years.  For immigrants from Nordic or other OECD countries, there 
is little systematic evidence of immigrant assimilation in the cross section.  This finding 
indicates that the actual assimilation rate must be even smaller than suggested by the table, 
because the emigration patterns discussed in the previous section imply that any measure of 
assimilation derived from cross-sectional data is upwardly biased (Borjas, 1985; Jasso and 
Rosenzweig, 1990). 
By contrast, among non-OECD immigrants the pattern from the 1996 cross section 
suggests rapid assimilation in the sense that these immigrants are acquiring country-specific 
human capital.  The longer immigrants from these regions of the world have been in Sweden 
the higher are their earnings.8 
Part of the sharp rise in relative earnings of new non-OECD immigrants may be due to 
increases in weeks or hours worked, instead of due to increased wages.  Even though we do 
not have wage data, we explore this possibility by comparing the relative earnings of 
immigrants from different entry cohorts whose 1996 earnings were above 36,200 SEK.9  As 
                                                  
8 Table A3 shows results from some variations on these estimations. As evident from Panel A, it appears as if 
no group reaches native earnings levels even after more than twenty years in Sweden. Further, Panel B shows 
that including additional control variables does not alter the results substantially. A comparison between A 
and B also reveals that the estimates on assimilation are very much alike using the two different reference 
groups. 
9 In 1996, this was the level of the “basic amount”, which determines e.g. eligibility for social assistance.  
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shown by panel B of Table 8, estimates based on our crude proxy for wages do reveal a more 
attenuated relation between earnings and time in Sweden.  This finding underscores the 
importance of labor force participation rates as indicators of success in the Swedish labor 
market. Nonetheless, among non-OECD immigrants who work regularly, it is still the case 
that 20 years in Sweden is associated with significantly higher earnings. The pattern is 
similar to that reported for relatively unskilled immigrants to the U.S. (LaLonde and Topel, 
1992; Duleep and Regets, 1998). By contrast, in Panel B we continue to find scant evidence of 




Table 8. Earnings assimilation, cross-sectional estimates 1996. 
Time since im.  1-5  6-10  11-15  16-20  N  Adj R2 
             
Panel A:             
All  -0.989  -0.487  -0.361  -0.209  15,690  0.16 
  (0.035)  (0.033)  (0.039)  (0.035)     
Nordic  -0.188  -0.090  -0.112  -0.077  5,947  0.05 
  (0.073)  (0.060)  (0.070)  (0.048)     
OECD  -0.049  -0.065  -0.172  -0.129  1,927  0.08 
  (0.105)  (0.103)  (0.108)  (0.100)     
Non-OECD  -1.129  -0.521  -0.372  -0.261  7,816  0.17 
  (0.052)  (0.050)  (0.058)  (0.056)     
             
Nordic – Male  -0.066  -0.080  -0.144  -0.162  2,688  0.04 
  (0.110)  (0.094)  (0.111)  (0.075)     
Nordic – Female  -0.298  -0.090  -0.072  0.000  3,259  0.06 
  (0.095)  (0.078)  (0.089)  (0.061)     
OECD – Male  -0.206  -0.163  -0.361  -0.312  1,180  0.10 
  (0.130)  (0.129)  (0.141)  (0.130)     
OECD – Female  0.171  0.051  0.115  0.141  747  0.05 
  (0.179)  (0.168)  (0.168)  (0.153)     
Non-OECD – Male  -0.994  -0.592  -0.431  -0.297  3,833  0.15 
  (0.080)  (0.074)  (0.087)  (0.084)     
Non-OECD – Female  -1.223  -0.449  -0.307  -0.224  3,983  0.19 
  (0.067)  (0.067)  (0.077)  (0.075)     
             
Panel B:             
Nordic – Male  0.078  -0.031  0.028  -0.063  2,404  0.04 
  (0.052)  (0.043)  (0.053)  (0.034)     
Nordic – Female  0.003  0.040  -0.010  0.026  2,889  0.05 
  (0.044)  (0.034)  (0.038)  (0.026)     
OECD – Male  0.024  -0.061  -0.023  -0.150  1,007  0.08 
  (0.065)  (0.062)  (0.070)  (0.063)     
OECD – Female  0.008  0.086  -0.094  -0.004  623  0.03 
  (0.083)  (0.077)  (0.074)  (0.067)     
Non-OECD – Male  -0.330  -0.216  -0.160  -0.195  2,745  0.11 
  (0.038)  (0.033)  (0.038)  (0.036)     
Non-OECD – Female  -0.368  -0.180  -0.121  -0.107  2,473  0.13 
  (0.034)  (0.029)  (0.033)  (0.032)     
             
Notes: OLS parameter estimates (standard errors in parentheses) from estimation of log earnings 1996 
on age and its square, and dummies for time since immigration 1-5, 6-10, 11-15, and 16-20 years 
respectively. Reference group: more than 20 years since immigration. Sample conditional on being in 
Sweden in 1997, 1996 immigrants excluded. 17<Age<65. Panel B also conditions on earnings being 




B. Evidence from the 1970 - 1997 Longitudinal Data 
In this section, we focus on how emigration affects measures of assimilation, and to what 
extent immigrants’ earnings converge with those of natives. As indicated above, cross-
sectional based measures of assimilation can be misleading if there has been a decline in 
immigrant “skills” over time, or there are high rates of emigration by less skilled 
immigrants. The figures in Table 8 account for the dramatic changes in the region of origin of 
Swedish immigrants. So, to some extent, our cross-sectional analysis accounts for this source 
of change in immigrant “quality.” Further, our prior analysis showing that non-OECD 
immigrants are not likely to emigrate suggests that the foregoing cross-sectional measures of 
assimilation are not distorted for this immigrant group. There may, however, have been 
changes in the within-group compositions that bias our results. Our longitudinal data allow 
us to explore these issues in greater depth. 
We turn to comparing the earnings growth of different immigrant groups during their 
first 10 years in Sweden to the average earnings growth of natives. This measure considers 
whether immigrants move upwards in the earnings distribution, and thereby if average 
immigrant earnings converge to those of natives. The upper panel of Table 9 summarizes the 
results when we do not control for emigration. According to these figures, immigrants’ 
earnings grow by on average 20’ SEK during the first ten years in Sweden.10 Given that 
immigrant earnings during their first full year in Sweden averaged 95’ SEK, this growth 
constitutes substantial convergence. Furthermore, it appears that there is convergence also 
among economic migrants, who have relatively high initial earnings. 
The foregoing estimate of the rate of immigrants’ earnings convergence to natives’ 
earnings may be misleading because less successful immigrants are emigrating during their 
first 10 years in Sweden. These emigrants have lower earnings, and when they emigrate, 
average earnings of remaining immigrants will increase even if individual earnings do not 
change. This effect will be reinforced if emigrants also have slower growing earnings, so that 
as they emigrate the average growth rates of the remaining immigrants’ earnings increase 
relative to that of natives.  
To account for this potential source of bias in our estimates, we compute the difference 
between the mean relative earnings of immigrants in two successive years, dropping from the 
                                                  
10 Note two things about the results. The earnings measure is indexed with the average native earnings level 
in each calendar year; thus, a positive number in Table 9 indicates an increase relative to natives. Also, the 
averages are calculated only on individuals potentially observed in both t and t-1.  
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sample persons who had emigrated during the most recent year. In this way we do only base 
our measures of immigrants’ earnings convergence on observed changes between t and t-1.  
The emigrants leave the sample and are not used in the calculation when they emigrate. 
Prior to that point their earnings growth figures in our computation of earnings convergence.  
We perform a similar calculation for each year starting with the year following the year 
of arrival, and finally estimate the total earnings growth as the sum of our measures of 
annual earnings growth. This method adjusts for emigration and the possibility that 
emigrant relative earnings were lower to begin with and/or grew more slowly than those of 
other immigrants because we ensure that our measure of year-to-year growth includes the 
same individuals.  
This method of accounting for emigration reveals that the earnings growth of Nordic 
and other OECD immigrants is slight. As shown by the lower panel of Table 9, the 
cumulative earnings growth of Nordic immigrants relative to natives during their first ten 
years in Sweden is only 2,600 SEK (about 2 percent). For OECD migrants we even estimate 
negative assimilation over the period. The faster growth rate that we find when we do not 
account for emigration is a result of low-earning Nordic and other OECD immigrants leaving 
Sweden at higher rates than their high-earning counterparts.  
By contrast, although emigration accounts for some of the relative growth in earnings 
of non-OECD immigrants compared to natives, there is still substantial evidence of earnings 
convergence. Indeed, as shown by Figure 1, most of this convergence occurs during the first 
three to four years after non-OECD immigrants arrive in Sweden.11 As discussed above in 
Section II, this evidence is consistent with research on U.S. immigration. Immigrants from 
ethnic groups who arrive in the U.S. earning less than the typical immigrant tend to have 
more rapidly growing earnings during subsequent years.  
The Nordic and OECD immigrants start with relatively high earnings, but experience 
little earnings growth relative to natives. Moreover, they never “catch up” to natives. Neither 
the cross-sectional nor the longitudinal analyses indicate that these particular economic 
immigrants acquire country-specific skills that cause their earnings to grow relative to either 
natives or their counterparts who arrived years earlier. This evidence may suggest that these 
immigrants have arrived in Sweden with sufficient knowledge of the country’s culture and 
institutions to take full advantage of their skills.   
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 By contrast, non-OECD immigrants start with low earnings, but experience more rapid 
relative earnings growth. This growth may result from these immigrants acquiring country 
specific skills that raise their earnings. Despite the growth, this group’s earnings remain far 
behind both their OECD counterparts and natives.12 Furthermore, the growth slows 
dramatically after only a few years in Sweden, and immigrants who spent ten years in 
Sweden do not have higher earnings than those who have only been in the country for five 
years. This contradicts the cross section results, which indicated that earnings continue to 
grow for 15 and even 20 years after arrival. Likely, this difference stems from within group 
changes in cohort quality that bias the results from the cross section. 
                                                                                                                                                                 
11 The patterns of assimilation seem to be stable over time. For example, when we split the sample according 
to immigration before and after 1980, we get very similar results as in the overall sample. 
12 The cross section estimates reported in Table A3 suggest that the remaining earnings gap is not due to 




Table 9. Income assimilation, with and without control for emigration. 
 
Average earnings in first full year (adjusted thousand 1997 SEK) 
  All  Nordic  OECD  Non-OECD 
  95.37  124.13  112.59  65.46 
  (109.58)  (114.27)  (156.45)  (72.94) 
         
No control for emigration. 
Variable  All  Nordic  OECD  Non-OECD 
Di2  8.972  6.128  5.018  15.640 
Di3  3.807  2.985  3.189  6.717 
Di4  2.963  5.431  0.280  3.357 
Di5  1.008  0.560  4.523  1.464 
Di6  0.812  2.385  -2.851  1.559 
Di7  1.569  0.235  1.634  2.970 
Di8  0.794  0.172  3.908  0.780 
Di9  0.501  0.828  0.046  0.722 
Di10  -0.618  -0.146  -0.104  -0.770 
Sum  19.807  18.579  15.642  32.439 
 
Control for emigration. 
Variable  All  Nordic  OECD  Non-OECD 
Di2  9.364  3.288  5.094  15.167 
Di3  3.631  0.976  1.247  6.078 
Di4  2.592  3.140  1.969  2.416 
Di5  0.278  -1.107  1.694  0.740 
Di6  -0.457  -0.152  -6.033  0.735 
Di7  0.415  -0.961  -2.533  1.956 
Di8  -0.142  -0.497  0.459  -0.080 
Di9  -0.694  -0.814  -2.361  -0.156 
Di10  -1.491  -1.249  -2.648  -1.331 
Sum  13.496  2.624  -3.112  25.527 
Notes: Numbers in real income adjusted thousands 1997 SEK. No control for emigration shows 
differences in averages over individuals. Control for emigration shows averages of individual 
differences. Non-earners included. In the panels, 1 means a 1000 SEK earnings increase 
























During the last 30 years, the earnings of immigrants to Sweden relative to natives has 
declined. This decline results primarily from a change in the composition of new immigrant 
cohorts away from economic migrants from the Nordic countries and toward migrants from 
non-OECD countries. Immigrants from these countries earn less, are less likely to be 
employed upon arrival in Sweden and receive more social assistance than other immigrant 
groups. Further, even many years after their arrival they still are economically 
disadvantaged both compared to other immigrant groups and to natives. Accordingly, the 
shift in immigrant composition toward political migrants from non-OECD countries indicates 
that in the future the disparity between immigrant and native material well-being will be 
larger than it has been in the past. 
Our study indicates that immigrants assimilate to some extent in the sense that their 
earnings grow relative to their native counterparts, but they do not catch up. Nordic 
immigrants are the most advantaged immigrant group, but even after 10 years in Sweden 
they still earn approximately 15 to 20 percent less than the typical native. Economic 
migrants’ earnings converge very little with natives’ after arrival. Non-OECD immigrants 
start out with a much greater earnings disadvantage. Their earnings converge more rapidly 
during their first five years in Sweden, but beyond this point we find little evidence of 
continued convergence, so the ten-year disparity we view as permanent. In the long-term 
Source: Table 9, control for emigration. Average immigrant earnings 
as percentage of natives’. The numbers on the x-axis denote years 
since immigration.  
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they end up earning about 40 percent less than then their native counterparts. This finding 
is similar to that found for immigrants to the U.S. where initial earnings are inversely 
related to the rate of assimilation. Immigrants from Mexico and East Asia experience lower 
earnings upon arrival to the U.S. than do immigrants from Western Europe, but in 
subsequent years their earnings grow more rapidly relative to similarly skilled natives.  
Measures of immigrant assimilation in Sweden are affected both by changes in the 
composition of immigrants and in emigration patterns. In the cross section, the relation 
between time in Sweden and relative earnings appears steeper than it actually is because the 
new immigrants tend to be low-paid arrivals from non-OECD countries and the earlier 
immigrants tend to be more successful migrants from the Nordic countries. To some extent, 
this misleading impression of the speed of immigrant assimilation can be accounted for by 
studying the relation between time in Sweden and relative earnings for immigrants from 
different regions of origin or more precisely studying separately likely economic and political 
migrants. However, the disparity between our findings in the cross section and in the 
longitudinal data suggests that within the group of non-OECD migrants labor market 
performance of has decreased in later cohorts. In a future paper we could check this 
contention by comparing new immigrant earnings to those of natives. 
Immigrant emigration does affect measures of assimilation for immigrants from Nordic 
and other OECD countries. Emigration rates for these immigrants are substantially larger 
than for likely political migrants from non-OECD countries. Further, among the likely 
economic migrants most of the emigration occurs within the first five years after arrival. 
Within this group of immigrants, we find that it is the least economically successful 
immigrants who migrate. We find initial attachment to the labor force rather than earnings 
for those who work as being the stronger predictor of who is likely to emigrate within five or 
ten years of arrival. 
Accordingly, despite Sweden having a narrower distribution of earnings and more 
generous social welfare system than does the U.S. or many other OECD countries, it is still 
the most economically successful immigrants within each group who stay. The implication of 
this pattern of emigration is that conventional measures of immigrant assimilation overstate 
the true rate of assimilation. We find that controls for emigration reduce the amount of  
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earnings convergence for Nordic immigrants by as much as 86 percent and for OECD 
immigrants by more than 100 percent.  
By contrast, immigrant emigration has less effect on measures of assimilation for 
immigrants from non-OECD countries. Emigration rates for these immigrants are relatively 
low, especially during the first five years after arrival, compared with other Swedish 
immigrants. Although emigration cannot affect this group’s assimilation measures very 
much, it is still the case that the most economically successful non-OECD immigrants stay 
and the least successful leave again. We find that those most attached to the labor force when 
they first arrive in Sweden are the most likely to stay. However, because emigration rates 
are so low, these findings imply that conventional measures of assimilation are somewhat 
upwardly biased, although not by much compared to comparable measures for the OECD 
immigrants. 
It is not surprising that we find large differences in emigration rates between economic 
and political migrants. This disparity is especially large over the first five years in Sweden 
when the percentage of non-OECD male immigrants who emigrate is more than 20 
percentage points less than the percentage of Nordic immigrants with comparable labor 
market status. The difference between the free migration of Nordic immigrants and the risks 
and costs political migrants face in considering emigration, illustrates that the most 
important factor determining emigration within the whole group of immigrants is not labor 
market outcomes, but rather whether one is an economic or political migrant. 
Still, within these different groups of immigrants, economic outcomes play a role in 
determining who leaves and who stays. Since it appears to be the less successful who leave, 
measures of assimilation that do not account for emigration will overstate the true degree of 
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This appendix describes the data used in the study. First, we outline the sample selection 
process, and then we describe the variables included in the data and their properties. The 
data employed in the study come from the population sample of the LINDA database, which 
contains a three percent cross-sectionally representative sample of the Swedish population. 
For details, see Edin and Fredriksson (2000).  
Immigration and emigration 
For the age range of interest, the LINDA sampling frame includes every person who lived in 
Sweden during a particular year. 13 An immigrant to Sweden enters the national registration 
(and thus the sampling frame) when he or she receives a residence permit. This means that 
asylum seekers awaiting decisions on their application are not included in our sample, but 
that anyone who receives a residence permit is included; no matter how long the individual 
remains in Sweden afterwards. 
Immigrants entering Sweden during the period 1970-1990 are identified, and can then 
potentially be followed through 1997. Immigration is defined in the following way: 
-  1970: Year of immigration set to 1970 in the 1970 census. 
-  1971-1981: Non-Swedish born individuals who are in data year t but not in year t-1 
receive immigration year t. (No variable for immigration year available for this 
period). 
-  1982-1990: Year of immigration set to t in the LINDA register. 
 
The individual’s exiting the registers identifies emigration. This means that we are not 
able to distinguish actual emigration from death, which are the two only ways a person can 
leave the registers. To mitigate this problem and to include only working-age people, we 
include only individuals in the ages 18-55 at immigration in the empirical analysis. Another 
problem is that people may have left the country before they leave the registers. It is 
unfortunately somewhat unclear how prevalent this problem is. In connection with the 1985 
census, it was estimated that 1 percent of Nordic immigrants, and 2.8 percent of other 
immigrants, in the registers were not in the country (Diaconescu and Tryggveson, 1992). 
                                                  
13 Before 1991, individuals aged 0-15 who died or emigrated during one year were not included in the sampling 
procedure for that year. Since we include only people in ages 18-55 at immigration, this is not a problem for 
our study.  
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Note also that our definition of immigration and emigration allows for multiple entries and 
exits. 
With this observation time span we can identify immigration after up to seven years at 
the shortest, and 27 years at the longest.14 For some applications we therefore exclude 
immigrant cohorts that we cannot follow long enough. Furthermore, when relating e.g. 
earnings in year t+1 to emigration in t+5, we must condition on the individual’s staying to 
t+2, so that the person lived in Sweden the full year when we measure earnings; otherwise 
the earnings measure for people leaving Sweden will be downward biased. 
Country of origin groups 
To investigate the possibility that behavior differs between immigrants with different 
backgrounds, we have made the following division into groups based on country of birth: 
1.  Nordic – Immigrants from the Nordic countries (Norway, Denmark, Finland, 
Iceland). 
2.  OECD – Countries (except Nordic) that were members of the OECD in 1985 
(excludes former Eastern European countries and Mexico). Exceptions: Turkey 
excluded, a number of small Western European countries included (Andorra, 
Cyprus, Malta, Monaco, Liechtenstein, San Marino, The Vatican). 
3.  Non-OECD – Countries not included in any of the above groups. 
 
Since 1954, there has been a common Nordic labor market, with free migration and rights for 
every Nordic citizen to receive social benefits in any Nordic country. Immigration from this 
group of countries, especially Finland, has always constituted a large fraction of the total 
immigration to Sweden. The reason for the division of the rest of the countries is that we 
want to identify immigrants who are likely to be refugees. There is no information on refugee 
status in the registers, and although of course not perfect, we believe that this criterion for 
grouping of countries is reasonable. 
The procedures for identifying immigrant cohorts described above retrieve a sample 
with size and properties as shown in tables 1and A1. It is clear that immigration from the 
Nordic group dominated in the beginning of the 1970s, and has then decreased somewhat 
sluggishly. The inflow from other OECD countries has been fairly constant, with a small 
downturn during the last two years of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s. Non-OECD 
                                                  
14 This includes the immigration year. Any person still in the registers in 1997 is not defined as an emigrant; 
therefore, the maximum stay before emigration is 1970–1996.  
 
34
immigration increased only slightly over the period until 1985; after that year it more than 
doubled within a few years. 
Supplementary sample – cross section 1996 
For some purposes, we use a sample of the cross section in 1996. This includes immigrants 
ages 18-64 in the LINDA population sample who immigrated in 1995 at the latest, and were 
still in Sweden in 1997; the number of immigrants in the sample is 15,690. In some 
instances, we also include a subsample of natives from the LINDA population sample cross 
section of 1996 as reference category. 
Variables 
Gender and age are available in the registers for the whole period; we measure age at 
immigration. Table 1 in the main text shows that males are somewhat overrepresented, 
especially in the OECD group. Average age at immigration is about 29 for the whole sample, 
and approximately two years lower in the Nordic group compared to the two others. 
Earnings 
The earnings variable used in the study is calculated from tax registers. Due to changes in 
the tax and benefit systems over the years, it is not possible to get a perfectly matched 
variable for the whole period. From 1978 and on, there are predefined variables for labor 
income. These variables include the sum of wage and self-employment earnings, minus 
transfers that are not direct compensation for absence from work (i.e. sickness assistance is 
included, but unemployment insurance is not). For years before 1978, we use the sum of wage 
and self-employment earnings. 
To get measures that are comparable over time, we adjust for the overall real earnings 
growth. This is achieved with an index for mean earnings of natives in the LINDA sample in 
each calendar year. In the regressions, we adjust by an index for natives’ earnings 
conditional on earnings larger than zero; in the assimilation calculations we include also 
immigrants with zero earnings, and therefore we adjust by an index for all natives, including 
non-earners. Note that these adjustments capture both changes in actual real earnings, and 
changes in the construction of the variable. For our purposes, this is desirable. All earnings 





Earnings from self-employment can be identified separately in the data. The tax register 
classifies earnings as coming from self-employment (including farming) depending on the 
extent of work the recipient puts into the business; normally the individual should not spend 
less than one-third of full-time employment on the business to get it classified as self-
employment earnings. We use an indicator variable for self-employment income larger than 
zero in a specific period to check the robustness of our results on overall earnings. 
Social assistance 
From 1983 and onwards, LINDA contains extensive information on transfers, among which 
social assistance and study allowances are included. We use amount received and months of 
receipt as alternative measures of the extent of social assistance dependency. Social 
assistance is given on a household basis, and all of it is then normally registered with one of 
the adults in the household. This has two implications. First, people can be recipients of 
social assistance without having it in the registers. To deal with this, we attribute the largest 
amount or number of months in a household to every individual in it. Second, the household 
as a basis for provision makes people with families more likely than singles to be eligible for 
social assistance, given their earnings. 
 
Study allowances 
Our measure of study allowances is available from 1983 and includes only traditional 
governmental allowances and loans, plus educational stipends for graduate students 





Table A1. Cohort sizes by group. 
         
Cohort  Nordic  OECD  Non-OECD  Total 
70  591  128  195  914  
71  418  199  192  809  
72  243  111  126  480  
73  219  119  135  473  
74  427  133  181  741  
75  492  142  208  842  
76  511  121  277  909  
77  410  113  255  778  
78  330  77  246  653  
79  405  97  253  755  
80  350  93  262  705  
81  219  99  247  565  
82  149  81  274  504  
83  167  78  180  425  
84  152  93  243  488  
85  108  48  234  390  
86  203  116  473  792  
87  224  128  546  898  
88  248  113  596  957  
89  438  108  772  1,318  
90  364  128  686  1,178  
         
Total  6,668  2,325  6,581  15,574  
Sample sizes for immigrant cohorts, restricted to 17<age at immigration<56. 
 















Source: Table A1.  
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Figure A2. Return migration within five years, study 
















































Source: Table 2 for our sample and Statistics Sweden data from ”SCB 
Befolkningsstatistik del 1-2, 1998”, p. 47. 




Table A3: Cross section estimates with natives and additional controls. 
Time since im.  1-5  6-10  11-15  16-20  21-  N  Adj R2 
Panel A:               
All  -1.187  -0.672  -0.549  -0.375  -0.127  43,386  0.22 
  (0.026)  (0.024)  (0.031)  (0.027)  (0.016)     
Nordic  -0.221  -0.116  -0.204  -0.152  -0.050  33,643  0.21 
  (0.062)  (0.051)  (0.062)  (0.040)  (0.018)     
OECD  -0.409  -0.419  -0.468  -0.368  -0.175  29,623  0.22 
  (0.070)  (0.071)  (0.079)  (0.072)  (0.034)     
Non-OECD  -1.448  -0.834  -0.675  -0.533  -0.257  35,512  0.26 
  (0.029)  (0.027)  (0.036)  (0.035)  (0.028)     
Panel B:               
All  -1.044  -0.512  -0.389  -0.230    15,690  0.18 
  (0.036)  (0.033)  (0.039)  (0.034)       
Nordic  -0.249  -0.106  -0.160  -0.109    5,947  0.08 
  (0.073)  (0.059)  (0.069)  (0.047)       
OECD  -0.168  -0.150  -0.215  -0.127    1,927  0.11 
  (0.110)  (0.103)  (0.107)  (0.098)       
Non-OECD  -1.145  -0.499  -0.356  -0.250    7,816  0.19 
  (0.053)  (0.050)  (0.057)  (0.056)       
               
Notes: Variations on estimations in Table 8. Additional controls: age and its square, gender, dummy for 
being married, interaction gender*married, and level of education dummies. Panel A includes natives as 
reference category, Panel B uses 21- as reference. To compare the estimates, subtract the estimate for 21- 
from estimates in Panel A. 
 
 